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In this chapter, we argue that the web is a poietically-enabling environment, which both 
enhances and requires the development of a “constructionist ethics”. We begin by 
explaining the appropriate concept of “constructionist ethics”, and analysing virtue ethics 
as the primary example. We then show why CyberEthics (or Computer Ethics, as it is 
also called) cannot be based on virtue ethics, yet needs to retain a constructionist 
approach. After providing evidence for significant poietic uses of the web, we argue that 
ethical constructionism is not only facilitated by the web, but is also what the web 
requires as an ethics of the digital environment. In conclusion, we relate the present 
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“Go create” 





Ethical issues are often discussed in terms of putative resolutions of hypothetical 
situations, such as “what should one do on finding a wallet in the lavatory of a 
restaurant?”. Research and educational purposes may promote increasingly dramatic 
scenarios (sometimes reaching unrealistic excesses1), with available courses of action 
more polarised and less easily identifiable as right or wrong. But the general approach 
remains substantially the same: the agent is confronted by a moral dilemma and asked to 
make a principled decision by choosing from a menu of alternatives. Moral action is 
triggered by a situation. 
In “situated action ethics” (to borrow an expression from AI), such moral 
dilemma may give the false impression that the ethical discourse concerns primarily a 
posteriori reactions to problematic situations in which the agent unwillingly and 
unexpectedly finds herself. The agent is treated as a world user, a game player, a 
consumer of moral goods and evils, a browser,2 a guest, or a customer who reacts to pre-
established and largely unmodifiable conditions, scenarios and choices. Only two 
temporal modes count: present and future. The past seems irrelevant (“how did the agent 
found herself in such predicament?”), unless the approach is further expanded by a 
casuistry analysis.  
                                                
1 See, for example, “the trolley problem” (Foot [1967] and Thomson [1976]; for a very entertaining parody 
do not miss “the revised trolley problem” in Patton [1988]). On “George’s job” and “Jim and the Indians” 
see Smart and Williams [1973]. Contrary to the trolley problem, the last two cases are meant to provide 
counterexamples against purely consequentialist positions.  
2 For an entirely “situation based ethics” approach to the Internet see for example Dreyfus [2001]. Dreyfus 
seems to ignore entirely any constructionist issue. His “anthropology” includes only single web users 
browsing the net. 
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But ethics is not only a question of dealing morally well with a given world. It is 
also a question of constructing the world, improving its nature and shaping its 
development in the right way. This proactive3 approach treats the agent as a world owner, 
a game designer or referee, a producer of moral goods and evils, a provider, a host, or a 
creator. The agent is supposed to be able to plan and initiate action responsibly, in 
anticipation of future events, in order to (try to) control their course by making something 
happen, or by preventing something from happening rather than waiting to respond 
(react) to a situation, once something has happened, or merely hoping that something 
positive will happen. 
There are significant differences between reactive and proactive approaches. 
There is no space to explore them here, but one may mention, as a simple example, the 
moral responsibilities of a webmaster as opposed to those of a user of a web site. Yet, 
differences should not be confused with incompatibilities. A mature moral agent is 
commonly expected to be both a morally good user and a morally good producer of the 
environment in which she operates, not least because situated action ethics can be 
confronted by lose-lose situations, in which all options may turn out to be morally 
unpleasant and every choice may amount to failure. A proactive approach may help to 
avoid unrecoverable situations. It certainly reduces the agent’s reliance on moral luck. As 
a result, a large part of an ethical education consists in acquiring the kinds of traits, values 
and intellectual skills that may enable the agent to switch successfully between a reactive 
and a proactive approach to the world. 
All this is acknowledged by many ethical systems, albeit with different 
vocabulary, emphasis, and levels of explicitness. Some more conservative ethical theories 
prefer to concentrate on the reactive nature of the agent’s behaviour. For example, 
                                                
3 We use the term “proactive” technically, to qualify policies, agents, processes or strategies that (a) 
implement effective action, in anticipation of expected problems, difficulties or needs, in order to control 
and prevent them, at least partially, rather than merely reacting to them as they occur (in this sense an 
ethically proactive approach can be compared to preventive medicine, which is concerned with reducing 
the incidence of disease by modifying environmental or behavioral factors that are causally related to 
illness); or that (b) actively initiate good changes, promoting rather than merely waiting for something 
positive to happen. 
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deontologism embeds a reactive bias insofar as it supports duties on-demand. Another 
good example is the moral code implicit in the Ten Commandments, which is less 
proactive than that promoted in the New Testament. On a more secular level, the two 
versions of Asimov’s laws of robotics provide a simple case of evolution. The 1940 
version is more reactive than the 1985 version, whose new zeroth law includes a 
substantially proactive requirement: “A robot may not injure humanity, or, through 
inaction, allow humanity to come to harm” (see Clarke [1993-4] for a full analysis and 
further references). 
Ethical theories that adopt a more proactive approach can be defined as 
constructionist. They are the ones that interest us here. One of the best examples of 
constructionist ethics is virtue ethics. The analysis of its scope and limits will introduce 
our discussion of a constructionist approach to CyberEthics.  
 
2. The scope and limits of virtue ethics as constructionist ethics  
According to virtue ethics, an individual’s principal ethical aim is to live the good life by 
becoming a certain kind of person. The constructionist stance is expressed by the desire 
to mould oneself. The goal is achieved by implementing or improving some 
characteristics, while eradicating or controlling others. The stance itself is presupposed: it 
is simply assumed as uncontroversial that one does wish to live the good life by 
becoming the best person one can. Some degree of personal malleability and capacity to 
choose critically provide further background preconditions. The key question “what kind 
of person should I be?” is (rightly, in our view) considered to be a reasonable and 
justified question. It grounds the question “what kind of life should I lead?” and 
immediately translates into “what kind of character should I construct? What kind of 
virtues should I develop? What sort of vices should I avoid or eradicate?”. It is implicit 
that each agent strives to achieve that aim as an individual,  with only incidental regard to 
the enveloping community. 
Different brands of virtue ethics disagree on the specific virtues and values 
identifying a person as morally good. The disagreement, say between Aristotle, Paul of 
Tarsus and Nietzsche, can be dramatic, not least because it is ultimately ontological, in 
that it regards the kind of entity that a human being should strive to become. In 
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prototyping jargon, theories may disagree on the abstract specification of the model, not 
just on implementation details. 
Despite their divergences, all brands of virtue ethics share the same subject-
oriented kernel. This is not to say that they are all subjectivist but rather, more precisely, 
that they are all concerned exclusively with the proper construction of the moral subject, 
be that a self-imposed task or an educational goal of a second party, like parents, teachers 
or society in general. To adopt a technical expression, virtue ethics is intrinsically 
egopoietic. Its sociopoietic nature is merely a by-product, in the following sense. 
Egopoietic practices that lead to the ethical construction of the subject inevitably interact 
with, and influence, the ethical construction of the community inhabited by the subject. 
So, when the subjective microcosm and the socio-political macrocosm differ in scale but 
essentially not in nature or complexity, as one may assume in the idealised case of the 
Greek polis, egopoiesis can scale up to the role of general ethics and even political 
philosophy. Plato’s Republic is an excellent example. Plato finds it unproblematic to 
move seamlessly between the construction of the ideal self and the construction of the 
ideal city-state. But so does the Mafia, whose code of conduct and “virtuous ethics” for 
the individual is based on the view that “the family” is its members. 
Egopoiesis and sociopoiesis are interderivable only in sufficiently simple and 
closed societies, in which significant communal behaviour is ultimately derivable from 
that of its constituent individuals. It is hard to specify “sufficiently” precisely, but some 
light can be cast here by trying to clarify what “simple” and “closed” mean.  
On the one hand, “simple” refers to the “vertical” growth of a society, that is to its 
degree of autonomy. A society is no longer sufficiently simple, but qualifies as 
increasingly complex, when some of the major new variables that govern its development 
are internal forces, emerging holistically from the actions and decisions of its members, 
forces like unemployment or price inflation, for example, which are beyond the control of 
single human agents.  
On the other hand, the threshold between a closed and an open society (no 
reference to Popper here) is to be identified in the level and relevance of interconnections 
and interactions between the society in question and other similar macro-agents. A 
sufficiently open society is one in which some of the major new variables that govern its 
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development are external forces influencing it from without. Therefore, “open” and  
“closed” indicate the relative degree to which interaction determines evolution. This is 
the “horizontal” growth of a society. 
Societies exhibit a continuum of stages, with simple and closed societies at one 
end of the continuum and, at the other end, societies open and complex enough to sustain 
autonomous behaviour and demonstrate emergent4 characteristics. As they evolve, 
societies may progress along the continuum. At some point, whilst immediate and 
personal interactions among all its members are still significant, in practice systemic 
forces may supervene, profoundly influencing the life of each individual. Such open and 
complex societies inherit from their constituent individuals autonomy and interactivity 
and, at a certain level of evolution, they become adaptive. They thus form (artificial) 
agents by virtue of those three properties (on the ethics of artificial agents see Floridi and 
Sanders [2001b]). In such societies, sociopoiesis is no longer reducible to egopoiesis 
alone. This is the fundamental limit of virtue ethics. In autonomous, interactive and 
adaptive societies, virtue ethics positions acquire an individualistic value, previously 
inconceivable, and may result in moral escapism. The individual still cares about her own 
ethical construction and, at most, the construction of the community with which she is 
more closely involved, like the family, but the rest of the world falls beyond the horizon 
of her moral concern. 
All this was true during the last centuries of the Roman Empire, for example, and 
applies equally well in our new era of globalisation. Phrasing the point in terms of 
situated action ethics, new problematic hypothetical situations arise from emergent 
phenomena. Examples include issues of disarmament, the ozone level, pollution, famine 
and the digital divide. The difficulty becomes apparent in all its pressing urgency as the 
                                                
4 Communal behaviours that are not immediately or directly so explicable are called emergent. Perhaps the 
simplest examples come from artificial communities. In Conway’s Game of Life, for example, the 
behaviour of an individual is determined by the states of its immediate neighbours. Stable, periodic or 
otherwise interesting behaviour (e.g. gliders, which retain their collective state but glide across the digital 
landscape) of subcommunities consisting of several individuals provide examples of emergent behaviour. 
In our own, real, global society, monetary inflation, unemployment and such phenomena whose dynamics 
are determined by feedback of data from subcommunities provide examples.  
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individual agent tries to reason using “local” ethical principles to tackle a problem with 
“global”, ethical features and consequences. 
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3. Why CyberEthics cannot be based on virtue ethics 
We are now in a position to distinguish between two phenomena often confused in the 
literature on CyberEthics: the renewed popularity of virtue ethics (a) in our society (see 
Slote [2000] for a sympathetic overview) and (b) in cyberspace (Coleman [1999], [2001]; 
Grodzinsky [2001]). 
In case (a), one is confronted by a context in which an individualistic culture 
facilitates practically, but does not justify theoretically, the return to a subject-oriented 
ethics. One should still properly object that (i) the kind of egopoiesis promoted by virtue 
ethics cannot (indeed, was not meant to) scale to very complex and open social contexts; 
and (ii) virtue ethics presupposes a philosophical anthropology (a theory of what it means 
to be fully human) that, in a sufficiently evolved social context, cannot be left embedded 
but that, once it is made fully explicit, requires an ethical justification to become 
acceptable precisely as a morally good anthropology, and hence as ethically preferable. 
In case (b), phenomena like the great popularity of “virtual communities” (see 
section 4.5), which arguably represent the digital re-incarnation of the polis, mean that 
people naturally tend to concentrate on the ethical construction of their “personae” as, at 
the same time, a contribution to the construction of the agent’s self and a substantial 
contribution to the construction of the local cyber-community, which is largely 
characterised by the members constituting it and inhabiting it. In this simple and closed 
context, an egopoietic approach is indeed fruitful, precisely for the same reasons it was in 
the polis. One is justified in arguing that virtue ethics may be all that is needed for the 
ethical well-being of the whole community. 
The two trends (a) and (b) have merged and currently interact in the information 
society, but they are better understood separately, lest one should mistakenly argue that 
because virtue ethics can work in small cyber-communities (comparable to local area 
networks) and it is popular “IRL” or “OT” (in real life or out there) it is also all that 
CyberEthics needs as a theoretical foundation. The opposite is true. Because virtue ethics 
remains limited by its subject-oriented approach and its philosophical anthropology, it 
cannot provide, by itself, a satisfactory ethics for a globalised world in general and for the 
information society in particular. If misapplied, it fosters ethical individualism, as the 
agent is more likely to mind only her own self-construction. If it is uncritically adopted, it 
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can be intolerant, since agents and theorists may forget the culturally over-determined 
nature of their foundationalist anthropologies, which often have religious roots. If it 
fosters tolerance, it may still spread relativism because any self-construction becomes 
acceptable, as long as it takes place in the enclave of one’s own private sphere, culture 
and cyber-niche, without bothering any neighbour. 
The inadequacy of virtue ethics is of course historical. The theory has aged well, 
but it can provide, at most, a local sociopoietic approach as a mere extension of its 
genuine vocation: egopoiesis. It intrinsically lacks the resources to go beyond the 
construction of the individual and the indirect role this may play in shaping her local 
community. Theoretically, however, the limits of virtue ethics should not lead to an 
overall rejection of any constructionist approach. On the contrary, the fundamentally 
constructionist lesson taught by virtue ethics (one of the features that make virtue ethics 
appealing in the first place) is more important than ever before. 
In a global information society,5 the individual agent (often a multi-agent system6) 
is like a demiurge. Her ontic powers can be variously exercised (in terms of control, 
creation or modelling) over herself (e.g. genetically, physiologically, neurologically and 
narratively), over human society (e.g. culturally, politically, socially and economically) 
and over natural or artificial environments (e.g. physically and informationally). Such an 
increasingly powerful agent has corresponding moral duties and responsibilities to 
oversee not only the development of her own character and habits but also the well-being 
of each of her spheres of influence. Clearly, a constructionist ethics should be retained 
and reinforced. The mistake (developing CyberEthics in terms of virtue ethics) lies not in 
the stress put on constructionism per se, but in the direction in which constructionism is 
presupposed to develop: namely only towards the individual source of the moral action 
(building the character of a human agent) instead of the receiver of the moral action as 
well, that is towards the patient, the object and more generally the environment affected 
                                                
5 On the history of the development of the global information society see Mattelart [2001]. 
6 A multi-agent system (MAS) is a conglomeration of interacting components, known as agents, capable of 
cooperating to solve problems that typically are beyond the individual capabilities or knowledge of each 
agent. Thus a MAS exhibits a greater system-level behaviour than its constituting agents (Huhns and Singh 
[1998]).  
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by the action. The kind of ethical constructionism needed today goes well beyond the 
education of the self and the political engineering of the simple and closed cyberpolis. It 
must also address the urgent and pressing question concerning the kind of global realities 
that are being built.7 This means decoupling constructionism from subjectivism and re-
orienting it to the object, applying it also to society and the environment, the receivers of 
the agent’s actions.8 
The term “ecopoiesis” refers to the morally-informed construction of the 
environment based on this object- or ecologically-oriented perspective. To move from 
individual virtues to global values an ecopoietic approach is needed that recognises the 
agent’s responsibilities towards the environment (including present and future 
inhabitants) as its enlightened, creator steward or supervisor, not just as its virtuous user 
and consumer. 
An ecopoietic ethics, like any form of constructionism, raises a fundamental 
ontological concern. Moral luck aside, the chances of constructing an ethically good x 
increase the better one knows what an ethically good x is, and vice versa. 
Constructionism depends on a (satisfactory epistemic access to, or understanding of, the) 
relevant ontology. In the context of digital environments, an ecopoietic ethics 
presupposes a substantial answer to the foundationalist question “what is the essential 
nature of information, computers and the internet?”. If virtue ethics presupposes a 
philosophical anthropology, an ecopoietic ethics seems to require a Philosophy of 
Information ([Floridi, 1999], [2002] and [2003a]). In the rest of this article, we shall not 
pursue this ontological foundation of constructionism. Instead of looking at the 
theoretical roots of constructionism, we shall concentrate on its branches, and seek to 
clarify the connection between CyberEthics and constructionism by showing how the 
                                                
7 We have addressed the issue of the construction of ethical artificial agents in Floridi and Sanders [2001b]. 
8 In Floridi [1999] and [forthcoming], we have argued that this is in line with the development of 
contemporary ethics, which has registered a general shift from the centrality of the agent in standard 
macroethics such as virtue ethics, deontologism, consequentialism and contractualism, to the centrality of 
the patient in non-standard macroethics such as environmental ethics, bioethics and medical ethics. 
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latter emerges from the web9 and how the web can benefit from a constructionist 
approach. 
 
4. Poiesis on the web 
The web is changing patterns of moral behaviour in many ways, with important 
repercussions on the development of the ethical discourse. Instances of situated action 
ethics, primarily with negative consequences, have attracted a large variety of detailed 
analyses, and account for most of the literature in CyberEthics (see for example Spinello 
and Tavani [2001] and other chapters in the present volume). The web, however, is not 
only a source of moral dilemma. As a new social space and digital environment, it has 
also greatly enhanced the possibility of developing egopoietic, sociopoietic and 
ecopoietic projects. It has thus contributed to the emergence of a constructionist ethics as 
a macroscopic phenomenon. In this section we shall consider a range of indicative 
examples, which well illustrate the ethics of constructionism.  
 
4.1 Interfaces 
Choosing and modelling one’s own interface to the digital world represents a first, 
indicative example of the kind of constructionism promoted by the web. A user’s most 
immediate interactions with the web lie with an interface, whose features therefore 
influence her view. By tradition, a well-designed interface offers its user a convenient 
mental model for the actions it supports. For instance, one design principle states that, if 
an action has different effects in different situations, the prevailing mode that determines 
the effect should be intuitively clear to the user. Typical mental models in this context are 
the “desktop”, “folder” and “filing cabinet”. As an example of the model clarifying the 
mode, by adopting the mental model of the text file as a folder the user is able to 
appreciate that the depression of a key has different effects when a text file is open or 
when it is closed. On the other hand, that model is limited because it does not address 
why the user needs periodically to “save” the results of editing the file.  
                                                
9 For current purposes no distinction is drawn between the internet and the web. 
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Laurel (Laurel [1991]) has proposed an alternative view of interfaces as theatre, 
following Aristotle’s six elements of drama. In order of increasingly abstract material 
cause (that one of Aristotle’s four causes, operating during the process of creation, which 
reflects the fabric from which a thing is made), together with their interpretation in 
human-computer activity, they are (adapted from Laurel [1991], Table 2.1]): 
MATERIAL CAUSE INTERFACE ACTIVITY 
Spectacle/enactment 
all sensory components of the action 
represented 
pattern/melody the pleasurable perception of pattern in the 
sensory phenomena 
Language/diction the selection and arrangement of signs, 
used semiotically 
Thought/reasoning 
the inferred internal processes leading to 
choice, of both human and computer 
Character/agency 
the bundles of predispositions and traits, of 
both human and computer 
plot/action 
the whole action; a collaboration between 
system and user. 
      
This approach places emphasis on designing the action (to be engaged in equally by user 
and computer) rather, for example, than on the user’s mental model. The computer is 
thought of as an enabling medium rather than a mere tool. Laurel’s metaphor, expressed 
in terms of Aristotle’s analysis of theatre, highlights the constructionist nature of interface 
design rather than the ontological properties emphasised in the ‘mode’ metaphor. Indeed, 
attributes at each level are constructed from those at the lower level. The agent is charged 
with the responsibility of building her own access to the digital environment. The insights 
gained by Laurel’s approach seem mainly to have been applied to the design of interfaces 
that are meant to stay in their delivered form. A more recent, “dynamic”, approach has 
been taken by computer manufacturers who recognise that many users want to configure 
their interface themselves (with scope ranging from the rather superficial choice of screen 
saver to more substantial matters of structure and mode of interaction). It seems to be 
more important to provide the user with a configurable interface than to provide a 
particularly elegant or efficient one: it is a consequence of the user’s constructionist drive 
that the act of configuring one’s own interface makes it preferable. 
L. Floridi - J.W. Sanders, Internet Ethics: the Constructionist Values of Homo Poieticus 
————————————————————————————————————————————————————— 
—————— Information Ethics Group – Research Report 25.02.03 —————— 14
4.2 Open Source 
The second logical step, after the construction of a personalised interface to the digital 
world, is the construction of digital entities that populate and interact in cyberspace. What 
should be the form of these entities? Along with use of the Internet and subsequently the 
web has come demand, from a surprisingly large number of users, for “open source” 
software. The average computer user interacts with an operating system by clicking on 
icons, dragging-and-dropping and so on. A user-friendly graphical interface (GUI) 
shields her not only from invoking commands directly (i.e. from typing the command 
name and whatever parameters it requires) but also, and more interestingly, from the 
underlying code that implements the operations. Consequently, even the experienced user 
has no way to access and modify the underlying source code, which executes operating 
system or applications commands. A system whose code is directly accessible to the user 
is said to be open source. 
The high demand10 for open source code is a reflection of the number of users 
who prefer, where possible, the option of configuring their own software rather than 
making do with off-the-shelf packages. This provides further evidence for the strength of 
constructionism (quite apart from the other factors involved in supporting the open source 
movement, which include a feeling of ‘brotherhood’ made possible by the web and in 
opposition to being dictated to by a monopolistic software company), but there is also a 
new factor involved. The major “extraordinary success” of the 1990s was Linux, a free, 
open-source version of Unix, whose remarkable story provides evidence of what may be 
called distributed constructionism. To clarify the point, consider the difference between 
Richard Stallman’s and Linus Torvalds’ strategies. 
                                                
10 A statistically insignificant presence in 1997, the popularity of Linux and the free/open source software 
movement has exploded in the last five years. In 2000, the International Data Corporation (www.idc.com) 
estimated that Linux was the fastest-growing server operating system, with 27% (up from 25% in 1999) of 
the server market, second only to Windows NT, which had 41% (up from 38 percent in 1999). Moreover, 
according to a new report from IDC (Server Operating Environments Market Forecast and Analysis, 2000-
2004) commercial shipments of Linux will grow at a compounded annual growth rate of almost 17% from 
1999 to 2004. 
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On the one hand, Richard Stallman’s Free Software Foundation (begun October 
1985, see Williams [2002]) released the code for components, as they were completed by 
Stallman himself, of his version GNU (GNU’s Not Unix) of the Unix operating system 
(GNU/Linux). “The overall purpose is to give the users freedom by giving them free 
software they can use and to extend the boundaries of what you can do with entirely free 
software as far as possible.” (Stallman, quoted in Moody [2002], 28). Stallman’s GNU 
GPL (General Public License) perpetuates, efficiently, the freeness of open source 
software and any derivatives resulting from modifications by its recipients. “This 
enormous efficiency acted as one of the main engines in driving the free software projects 
on to their extraordinary successes during the 1990s” (Moody [2002], 28). Initially, 
circulation of the original components was by magnetic tape from Stallman or people 
affiliated to his project, when the web was not yet a common medium of communication. 
Controlled by Stallman, the enterprise still exhibited egopoietic values, most notably it 
was meant to promote a software version of the “freedom of speech” movement.   
On the other hand, Linus Torvalds launched his project for the development of 
Linux by relying entirely on distributed constructionism, that is the unsuspected but 
evident interest, shared by a growing community, in coordinating efforts to achieve a 
global product whilst each realising only a local specific component of it. The project 
took full advantage of the web’s point-to-point penetration. Human communities tend to 
be rigidly structured, so that direct communication between individuals is highly 
constrained. The media can be seen as partially facilitating that tendency, and mobile 
phones help to implement it to a restricted degree. But the web removes that constraint 
almost entirely amongst its “netizens”, and provides a poietic-enabling environment 
through which the community of users and developers of Linux could interact and 
communicate easily and efficiently. Linux has clearly developed as an ecopoietic 
enterprise. 
The difference between the two approaches has not passed unnoticed.11 It has 
been well summarised by Eric Raymond in The Cathedral and the Bazaar : “Linux 
                                                
11 Moody [2002] seems to underestimate the “philosophical” contrasts between the two movements, on 
which see for the documents cited in the bibliography under the entries Free Software Foundation Website 
and Open Source Software Website. 
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overturned most of what I thought I knew. ... I believed that the most important software 
...[like that of Stallman] ... needed to be built like cathedrals, carefully crafted by 
individual wizards or small bands of mages working in splendid isolation, with no beta to 
be released before its time. Linus Torvalds’ style of development - release early and 
often, delegate everything you can, be open to the point of promiscuity - came as a 
surprise ... the Linux community seemed to resemble a great babbling bazaar of differing 
agendas and approaches”. (Raymond [2001], 21).  
The difference between Stallman’s and Torvalds’ strategies may appear to be 
partly attributable, historically, to different stages in the development of the Internet. 
Conceptually, however, it is really the result of two different constructionist ethics. Linux 
and other similar open source products are built and maintained as an expression of 
distributed constructionism on the web. They provide another dimension to Stallman’s 
simple individual constructionism, and one supported amply by the web, which is thereby 
seen to provide a robust support for collaboration without attrition.  
 
4.3 Digital Arts 
The availability of web-based interfaces and software make possible the construction of 
forms of digital art previously unimaginable. Murray [2000] has identified three 
characteristic pleasures of digital environments in general: 
1) immersion, the participatory immersive medium intensifies the age-old desire to live 
out fantasy. Rather than Coleridge’s “willing suspension of disbelief”, she proposes it to 
be viewed, more realistically, as supporting “the active creation of belief” (p. 110, 
emphasis added); 
2) agency, that is ‘the satisfying power to make meaningful action and see the results of 
our decisions and choices’ (p. 126); and 
3) transformation, that is the shape-shifting, morphing possible because of the digital 
representation of data and the ease with which it can be transformed. 
For the purpose of analysing the future of digital narrative, Murray reflects: “These 
pleasures are in some ways continuous with the pleasures of traditional media and in 
some ways unique. Certainly the combination of pleasures, like the combination of 
properties of the digital medium itself, is completely novel”. (Murray [2000], 181). 
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Murray’s interest is in digital environments generally, not specifically in those supported 
by the web. The web is public in a way that other digital media are not. Nevertheless, if 
we add to Murray’s three pleasures that of interactivity, we are led to investigate the 
wider field of digital art and the impact that constructionism has had on it.  
Digital art has shared with CyberEthics its first half century of existence (Reffen 
Smith [1997]). Over this period, the topic has expanded with the pervasive influence of 
the digital medium and now includes graphic art, musical composition, poetry, 
architectural style and cinema as well as narrative fiction. Despite such variety, it seems 
that “digital art is novel in two ways, the first deriving from virtual reality techniques and 
the second deriving from the capacity of computers to support interactivity” (Lopes 
[2003]). Because the result of some digital art is difficult to distinguish from traditional 
art, emphasis is placed on the process rather than the product. (If a computer can solve 
crosswords faster than I can - albeit by the brute-force method of searching through a 
dictionary and trying all feasible combinations - then, one reasons, at least the way I do it 
cannot be mimicked by computer. Again, if a computer can produce Picasso-like pictures 
- albeit routinely by digitising a photo and then processing an abstraction of it - then, one 
reasons, at least Picasso’s originality is inimitable). The same emphasis, on process rather 
than product, is made by Binkley (Binkley [1998]) who identifies the objects being 
manipulated, or maculated, by artists as being digital (data structures rather than paint or 
cardboard) with the result that the artwork produced lacks physical uniqueness and can in 
fact be copied electronically indefinitely. His view of process can be interpreted as 
acknowledging the importance of constructionism. Indeed, Binkley makes the point that, 
with the web, the objects of construction may bear little resemblance to those of earlier 
generations. 
 
4.4 Homepages and the construction of the self 
With interfaces, software and even new forms of art being constructed in cyberspace, the 
self is next in line. Web sites are certainly popular new objects of creation. The reason 
lies partly with the recent development of e-commercial models of marketing (if you 
want to buy a lounge suite, visit our web site and simulate how it would appear in your 
room), partly with human desire or need for communication (from government legislation 
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to photos of the grandchild’s first birthday), partly with a new wave of constructionism 
concerning the self through personal homepages (Chandler [1998], see also Adamic and 
Adar [online]). Although graduates of computer science who once would have gone into 
programming jobs now go into web design, the sale of off the shelf software for 
constructing web pages is burgeoning.  
 
4.5 Virtual communities 
With the construction of the self, we have reached the starting point for the construction 
of virtual communities. What can we learn from socio-cyber-phenomena like web-based 
chat-rooms, interest groups, ICQ-like communities, newsgroups, online forum etc., which 
rely for their existence on point-to-point communication offered by the web? Until 
recently, it was common to argue, pessimistically, that the Web prompted people to 
withdraw from social engagement and become isolated, depressed and even alienated. 
According to a constructionist view, however, the Web actually provides a poietic-
enhancing environment, which should facilitate, rather than hinder, the construction, the 
development and the reinforcement of self-identities, of links with local (real and/or 
virtual) communities and of social interactions. New data confirm this prediction. Virtual 
communities have become the most popular Web domain category, after search engines 
and portals (source: Nielsen//NetRatings, April 26, 2002, 
http://www.acnielsen.at/at/news/press/2002_04_26_110502/FULLTEXT.PDF). And a 
report published by the Pew Internet & American Life Project 
(http://www.pewinternet.org/), entitled Online Communities: Networks that nurture long-
distance relationships and local ties (October 31, 2001), has shown that “the online world 
is a vibrant social universe where many Internet users enjoy serious and satisfying contact 
with online communities. These online groups are made up of those who share passions, 
beliefs, hobbies, or lifestyles. Tens of millions of Americans have joined communities 
after discovering them online. And many are using the Internet to join and participate in 
longstanding, traditional groups such as professional and trade associations. All in all, 
84% of Internet users have at one time or another contacted an online group.” 
(http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdfs/PIP_Communities_Report.pdf). Virtual 
communities are a flourishing result of the free exercise of the constructionist drive. In 
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them, users reveal personal facts, “flame”, and switch personas by endlessly constructing, 
deconstructing and reconstructing alternative selves. They collaborate with and 
participate in a common social project. In general, they behave quite differently from the 
way they would behave in person. It is as if the normal metric of social distance were 
expanded by the web. The web empowers new categories of users with the possibility of 
constructing a new self and an e-polis. It makes constructionism an open option for 
anyone with access to an Internet connection. 
 
4.6 Constructionism on the Web 
What is the nature of constructionism as exhibited on the web? The previous examples 
show that the characteristic features of the web that seem particularly relevant to existing 
instances of constructionism are: interactivity, virtuality, agency, transformationality, 
process- (rather than product-) orientation, social publicity, and immediate point-to-point 
communication, which allows collaboration without attrition due to an apparent increase 
in social distance. Constructionism emerges as a most significant and intrinsic property of 
the web, more fundamental than any policy vacuum or pressing practical problems. The 
increased social distance means that the ethical consequences of constructionism on the 
web are particularly acute. Indeed, the apparent increase in social distance acts as a 
magnifier for ethical factors. 
 
5. Homo Poieticus  
Homo sapiens has primary needs, which relate to survival (like food, shelter, security and 
reproduction), and secondary needs (like hedonistic, intellectual, artistic and physical 
pursuits), which arise once primary needs are fulfilled. Constructionism seems to be 
amongst such secondary needs. It is the drive to build physical and conceptual objects 
and, more subtly, to exercise control and stewardship on them. It manifests itself in the 
care of existing, and creation of new, realities, being these material or conceptual. Thus, 
constructionism is ultimately best understood as a struggle against entropy. Existentially, 
it represents the strongest reaction against the destiny of death. In terms of a 
philosophical anthropology, constructionism is embodied by what we have termed 
elsewhere homo poieticus (Floridi [1999]). Homo poieticus is to be distinguished from 
L. Floridi - J.W. Sanders, Internet Ethics: the Constructionist Values of Homo Poieticus 
————————————————————————————————————————————————————— 
—————— Information Ethics Group – Research Report 25.02.03 —————— 20
homo faber, user and “exploitator” of natural resources, from homo oeconomicus, 
producer, distributor, and consumer of wealth, and from homo ludens (Huizinga 1970), 
who embodies a leisurely playfulness devoid of the ethical care and responsibility 
characterising the constructionist attitude.12 Homo poieticus concentrates not merely on 
the final result, but on the dynamic, on-going process through which the result is 
achieved. A punctured bicycle tyre may be mended entirely routinely (in primary fashion, 
for “survival” on a busy day) with little component of construction, or it may be mended 
in a more deliberate, considered fashion, perhaps with reflection on the process and what 
it is being achieved. In the case of the web, the ease with which digital constructs can be 
created and altered means that cyberspace is an ideal environment for homo poieticus. 
Many influential teachers of constructive disciplines emphasise in their teachings an 
approach to their art that we can now identify as constructionist, to distinguish it from the 
ludic, the routine or the mundane approach. Often these teachings draw from eastern 
philosophy and mysticism to make the point that the process, and the novice’s state of 
mind during it, are of fundamental importance. The end result will “take care of itself”, if 
the process is right.13 
Given the importance we have attached to homo poieticus, it would be surprising 
if its nature had not been studied in other contexts. Two indicative examples are worth 
mentioning here, to enable the reader to place our position within a wider context.14 
Piaget (Gruber and Vonëche [1995]) coined the term constructivism  for an 
epistemic model in which children learn whilst interacting with their environment, by 
manipulating and building objects and developing coherent intellectual structures. Papert 
(Papert [1993]) extended Piaget’s work from genetic epistemology to the child’s 
construction of microworlds and called the result constructionism: “My perspective is 
                                                
12 Evers 2000 has associated the Open Source movement to Homo Ludens. 
13 Particularly interesting examples of a constructionist attitude arise in most of the fine arts. To name just 
two, we refer to architecture (Alexander [1970], Liebeskind [online]) and cabinetmaking (Krenov [1976]). 
14 We do not address here the critical issue of the connections between ethical constructionism and social 
constructivism. On the interactions between philosophy of technology and social constructivism see Brey 
[1997]. 
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more interventionist. My goals are education, not just understanding. So, in my own 
thinking I have placed a greater emphasis on two dimensions implicit but not elaborated 
in Piaget’s own work: an interest in intellectual structures that could develop as opposed 
to those that actually at present do develop in the child, and the design of learning 
environments that are resonant with them.” Inspired by both, Murray (Murray [2000]) is 
interested, as we have seen above, in the possibilities for narrative fiction in Cyberspace. 
She uses Piaget’s term “to indicate an aesthetic enjoyment in making things within a 
fictional world” (p. 294). Indeed, she claims that “constructivist pleasure is the highest 
form of narrative agency the MUD [Multi User Domain] medium allows” (p. 149). 
Whilst for Piaget and Papert the mental process of construction is autonomous and even 
subconscious, for Murray (and for us) it is typically explicit. More recently, constructivist 
methodologies have been applied to digital media. In Eisenstadt and Vincent [2000], for 
example,  we read that: “Our approach to media rich learning experiences derives from 
constructivist models of education” (p. ix); the aim is “[...] empowering individuals to 
create their own content” (p. ix). In this case, the difference between the two approaches 
is that, for our constructionist perspective, the fundamental novelty brought about by 
computer-based or online learning has got little to do with long-distance courses, virtual 
classes and tele-presence, for it is rather to be identified in the vindication of the “maker’s 
knowledge” tradition.15 ICT makes possible hands-on experiences, simulations, 
collaborations, and interactions with conceptual or information structures that can be 
built, manipulated, disassembled and so on, thus completely transforming the 
learning/teaching experience. 
The process-oriented component of our concept of constructionism also has an 
interesting precedent in literary theory. Genetic criticism (critique genetique)16 was the 
name given in the early 1970s to an empirical approach to the literary act “d’expliquer 
par quels processus d’invention, d’ecriture et de transformation un projet est devenu ce 
                                                
15 The Maker’s Knowledge Tradition goes back to Plato. It is the view that an epistemic agent knows, 
understands or otherwise epistemically controls better (or perhaps only) what the agent has made. 
16 For a summary of genetic criticism and two case studies (Flaubert and Proust) see Schmid [1998]. There 
is an interesting tension produced by a rigid application of those ideas when text is interpreted as digital art; 
our notion of constructionism provides one resolution of it. 
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texte auquel l’institution conferera ou non le statut d’oeuvre litteraire.” (Gresillon [1994], 
206). However, the concept differs from ours in subscribing firmly to written traces: 
“Genetic criticism has used the post-structuralist dissolution of the closed text to define 
its own notion of the fluid, dynamic manuscript text which, since it is not in any 
published form, is subject to constant revision. At the same time, genetic criticism has 
abandoned the vague post-structuralist conception of the text as an interactive process. 
The genetic approach reinstalls the text in its materiality. Its objects of inquiry are the 
material traces of writing.” (Schmid [1998], 12).  
 
6. Conclusion: from CyberEthics to Information Ethics 
For its first half century, CyberEthics, the ethics of ICT and in particular of the web, has 
been a situated action ethics. The point becomes clear if one reads Bynum’s overview 
(Bynum [2001], see also http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-computer/), which aims 
to survey the “historical milestones” of the subject, decade by decade. According to 
Bynum, “the best way to understand what the field is like is to examine some example 
sub-areas of current interest”. He considers the workplace, security, ownership and 
professional responsibility. Clearly, the approach to CyberEthics (Computer Ethics) has 
been predominantly pragmatic and action-oriented.17 
In the absence of any foundational principle, the field is reduced to a collection of case-
based analyses. 
The battle cry for the 1990s has been James Moor’s quote: “A typical problem in 
computer ethics arises because there is a policy vacuum about how computer technology 
should be used” (Moor [1985]). In the tailwind of CyberEthics’s policy vacuum, much of 
the discussion has concentrated on the extent to which the web, or internet more 
generally, provides only a context of application for standard ethical issues in silico (the 
uniqueness problem of Computer Ethics). The conclusion has been that, at the very least, 
the web magnifies many ethical issues (security, privacy, ownership and so on).  
                                                
17 For a conceptual analytic history of Information Ethics, complementing Bynum’s collection of 
milestones, see Floridi and Sanders [2002] and Tavani [2002]. 
